What are phenomenal qualities, the qualities of conscious experiences?
How do the phenomenal aspects of conscious experiences relate to brain processes?
To what extent do experiences represent the things around us, or the states of our own bodies?
Are phenomenal qualities subjective, belonging to inner mental episodes of some kind, and merely dependent on our brains? Or should they be seen as objective, belonging in some way to the physical things in theworld around us?
Are they physical properties at all? The problematic nature of phenomenal qualities makes it hard to understand how the mind is related to the physical world.
There is no settled view about these issues, which concern some of the deepest, and most central, problems in philosophy. Fourteen original papers, written by a team of distinguished philosophers and psychologists and set in context by a full introduction, explore the ways in which phenomenal qualities fit in with our understanding of mind and reality.
The topics covered include: phenomenal concepts, the relation of sensory qualities to the modalities, the limits of current theories about physical matter; problems about the nature of perceptual experience, projectivism, and the extent to which perception is direct; non-conceptual content, the representational nature of pain experience, and the phenomenology of thought; and issues relating to empirical work on synaesthesia, psychological theories of attention, and prospects for unifying thephenomenal array with neurophysiological accounts of the brain.
This volume offers an indispensable resource for anyone wishing to understand the nature of conscious experience.