Spending to Win : Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies Paperback / softback
by Stephanie J. (London School of Economics and Political Science) Rickard
Part of the Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series
Paperback / softback
Description
Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many.
Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others?
Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities.
Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography.
Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations.
Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate.
No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation.
Information
-
Less than 10 available - usually despatched within 24 hours
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:262 pages, Worked examples or Exercises; 14 Tables, black and white; 10 Halftones, black and white
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:23/01/2020
- Category:
- ISBN:9781108432030
Information
-
Less than 10 available - usually despatched within 24 hours
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:262 pages, Worked examples or Exercises; 14 Tables, black and white; 10 Halftones, black and white
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:23/01/2020
- Category:
- ISBN:9781108432030
