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None Explaining the Mental : Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes, PDF eBook

None Explaining the Mental : Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes PDF

Edited by Michael Beaney, Carlo Penco

PDF

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Description

The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches.

There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have taken place over the last century in the human and cognitive sciences - most notably, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurophysiology, AI, and cognitive science itself. In all these sciences, there is a need to delineate the domain of the mental and to elucidate the key concepts and underlying assumptions. This need is widely recognized, but approaches and answers vary significantly. Some stress the representational features involved in most of our mental processes, others the inferential dimension; some stress the necessity of using empirical data, others the need to refine ideas before pursuing and drawing on empirical research.

The papers collected in this volume are grouped into four parts, on language and thought, on knowledge, belief and action, on intentionality, and on naturalism. The volume will be welcomed by all those engaged and interested in debates about the mental in philosophy and the human and cognitive sciences.

Table of Contents

PART I: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Andrew Woodfield, Public Words Considered as Vehicles of Thinking

Andrea Bianchi, Speaking and Thinking (Or: A More Kaplanian Way

to a Unified Account of Language and Thought)

Stefano Predelli, The Strange Case of the Missing Constituent

PART II: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND ACTION

Pascal Engel, Taking Seriously Knowledge as a Mental State

Carlo Gabbani, Epistemology and the Eliminative Stance

Jennifer Hornsby, Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for Acting

Wolfgang Kuenne, Some Varieties of Deception

PART III: INTENTIONALITY

Sandro Nannini, Intentionality Naturalised

Elisabetta Sacchi, Thought and Thinking: the Ontological Ground of

Intentionality

Elisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?

PART IV: NATURALISM

Marcello Frixione, Do Concepts exist? A Naturalistic Point of View

Tim Crane, Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challenge

of the Explanatory Gap

Achim Stephan and Robert C. Richardson, What Physicalism Should

Provide Us With

Mario De Caro, The Claims of Naturalism

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