Please note: In order to keep Hive up to date and provide users with the best features, we are no longer able to fully support Internet Explorer. The site is still available to you, however some sections of the site may appear broken. We would encourage you to move to a more modern browser like Firefox, Edge or Chrome in order to experience the site fully.

The Synaesthesia of a Blind Subject, With Comparative Data From an Asynaesthetic Blind Subject, PDF eBook

The Synaesthesia of a Blind Subject, With Comparative Data From an Asynaesthetic Blind Subject PDF

PDF

Please note: eBooks can only be purchased with a UK issued credit card and all our eBooks (ePub and PDF) are DRM protected.

Description

Whilst the greatest effort has been made to ensure the quality of this text, due to the historical nature of this content, in some rare cases there may be minor issues with legibility. 1. General Introduction<br><br>In a recent monograph (11) the senior writer reviewed the general subject of synaesthesia and described a very complicated case in a blind reagent.

In that investigation it was found that the reagent not only associated a color or a certain degree of brightness with every sensory experience other than the visual but also that these same colored associates invariably appeared in his processes of thinking wherever imagery was employed.

The investigation here reported is largely concerned with a description of these analogous associations in certain of the higher a intellectual processes.<br><br>Out of the vast amount of literature on synaesthesia we find very little mention of the existence of synaesthetic phenomena in connection with mental processes other than that of perceiving.

In no instance has a case in the realm of thinking been fully described.

In fact we do not know to what extent, in the. same individual, synaesthetic phenomena appear both in perceiving and in thinking.

So far as our knowledge goes no case has ever been reported in which colored associates or allied associated imagery appeared in thinking but not in perceiving.

There seems to be good reason for believing that where such phenomena appear in perceiving, they likewise occur in thinking and that the failure to report this fact, generally, in the literature on synaesthesias has been due to superficial investigations of the phenomena.

Information

Other Formats

Information