Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy Hardback
Edited by Stephan (University of California, San Diego) Haggard, Matthew D. (University of California, San Diego) McCubbins
Part of the Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series
Hardback
Description
Advocates of parliamentary rule have been highly critical of presidentialism for dividing powers and providing the opportunity for gridlock between branches.
Fixed executive terms can saddle publics with ineffectual leaders who are not easily removed.
Yet the great theorists of presidential rule, beginning with the Federalists, saw very different qualities in the same institutions: a desirable combination of strong leadership with checks on executive discretion.
These diverse assessments arise because we have surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function.
The introductory essays in this volume lay the theoretical groundwork for such comparative analysis.
Drawing on detailed cases of economic policymaking in Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, this book shows the diversity of presidential systems and isolates the effects of presidentialism from other factors that influence public policy, such as party systems.
In doing so, it casts doubt on the critics of presidential rule and underscores the continuing vitality of this particular form of democratic rule.
Information
-
Out of stock
- Format:Hardback
- Pages:378 pages, 47 Tables, unspecified; 13 Line drawings, unspecified
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:15/01/2001
- Category:
- ISBN:9780521773041
Information
-
Out of stock
- Format:Hardback
- Pages:378 pages, 47 Tables, unspecified; 13 Line drawings, unspecified
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:15/01/2001
- Category:
- ISBN:9780521773041
