Body, Mind and Self in Hume's Critical Realism Hardback
by Fred Wilson
Part of the Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis series
Hardback
Description
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct.
The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society.
A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle.
Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct.
In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person.
But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length.
Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
Information
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Out of stock
- Format:Hardback
- Pages:512 pages
- Publisher:De Gruyter
- Publication Date:15/02/2008
- Category:
- ISBN:9783110326680
Other Formats
- PDF from £145.50
Information
-
Out of stock
- Format:Hardback
- Pages:512 pages
- Publisher:De Gruyter
- Publication Date:15/02/2008
- Category:
- ISBN:9783110326680
