Please note: In order to keep Hive up to date and provide users with the best features, we are no longer able to fully support Internet Explorer. The site is still available to you, however some sections of the site may appear broken. We would encourage you to move to a more modern browser like Firefox, Edge or Chrome in order to experience the site fully.

Cooperative and Noncooperative Multi-level Programming, Hardback Book

Cooperative and Noncooperative Multi-level Programming Hardback

Part of the Operations Research/Computer Science Interfaces Series series

Hardback

Description

To derive rational and convincible solutions to practical decision making problems in complex and hierarchical human organizations, the decision making problems are formulated as relevant mathematical programming problems which are solved by developing optimization techniques so as to exploit characteristics or structural features of the formulated problems.

In particular, for resolving con?ict in decision making in hierarchical managerial or public organizations, the multi level formula tion of the mathematical programming problems has been often employed together with the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.

However,weconceivethatapairoftheconventionalformulationandthesolution concept is not always suf?cient to cope with a large variety of decision making situations in actual hierarchical organizations.

The following issues should be taken into consideration in expression and formulation of decision making problems.

Informulationofmathematicalprogrammingproblems,itistacitlysupposedthat decisions are made by a single person while game theory deals with economic be havior of multiple decision makers with fully rational judgment. Because two level mathematical programming problems are interpreted as static Stackelberg games, multi level mathematical programming is relevant to noncooperative game theory; in conventional multi level mathematical programming models employing the so lution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, it is assumed that there is no communi cation among decision makers, or they do not make any binding agreement even if there exists such communication.

However, for decision making problems in such as decentralized large ?rms with divisional independence, it is quite natural to sup pose that there exists communication and some cooperativerelationship among the decision makers.

Information

Other Formats

Save 13%

£129.99

£112.49

Item not Available
 
Free Home Delivery

on all orders

 
Pick up orders

from local bookshops

Information

Also in the Operations Research/Computer Science Interfaces Series series  |  View all