The Puzzle of Clientelism : Political Discretion and Elections Around the World Paperback / softback
by Miriam A. (European University Institute, Florence) Golden, Eugenia (London School of Economics and Political Science) Nazrullaeva
Part of the Elements in Political Economy series
Paperback / softback
Description
This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world.
Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low.
Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection.
The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors.
The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism.
Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.
Information
-
Only a few left - usually despatched within 24 hours
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:75 pages, Worked examples or Exercises; Worked examples or Exercises
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:23/02/2023
- Category:
- ISBN:9781009323215
Information
-
Only a few left - usually despatched within 24 hours
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:75 pages, Worked examples or Exercises; Worked examples or Exercises
- Publisher:Cambridge University Press
- Publication Date:23/02/2023
- Category:
- ISBN:9781009323215
