What Should We Believe? : The Fundamentals of Epistemology Hardback

by Thomas Kelly, James Pryor

Part of the Fundamentals of Philosophy series

Hardback

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Description

Pryor and Kelly's book will offer a sophisticated introduction to the core themes driving debate in contemporary epistemology which, commensurate with the series brief, will not blandly survey the field.

Unlike many of the dry, analytical epistemology texts which tour through and adjudicate between the various attempts to define knowledge, Kelly and Pryor take as the central concern of epistemology the question 'What Should I Believe?'.

This refocus reflects a general move away from seeing 'knowledge' and its conditions as the main concern of epistemology.

So, although its hardly revolutionary to focus on normative questions of justification and rationality of belief, the approach Kelly and Pryor take, plus the fact they are two of the finest young epistemologists in the US should give this a really fresh feel (as reviewers testify).

Consider the following question: 'What should I believe?' This question is a normative question.

It is, of course, notoriously obscure exactly what one is claiming when one claims that a given question is a normative question. (Indeed, this issue is among those which we will explore.) But intuitively, the question 'What should I believe?' differs from purely descriptive questions such as 'What do I believe?' or 'What will I believe?' in a way in which it resembles other paradigm normative questions such as 'What should I do?' It is this question which serves as both the starting point and guiding focus of our book, an exploration of select issues in contemporary epistemology.

Our choice of guiding question affects the content of the book in various ways.

For example, unlike many epistemology books, we do not discuss the project of analyzing the concept of knowledge, in the sense of attempting to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the correctness of its application.

Indeed, issues concerning the concept of knowledge are in general less central to the book than issues which bear more directly on questions about what one is justified in believing.

In keeping with this emphasis on the distinctively normative aspects of epistemology, we will devote considerable attention to issues that are sometimes discussed under the rubric 'the ethics of belief'-questions about the nature of epistemic norms, what reason we have to conform to such norms, the extent to which what we believe is under our voluntary control, and so on. In addition to this strong emphasis on the concept of justification and concern with the normative aspects of epistemology, various other topics will receive more extended treatment than is usual.

These include: the role of probability in epistemology, questions about rationality over time, the concept of coherence, relevant alternatives theories, and contextualist approaches to skepticism.

We will also devote more attention than is usual to certain key areas of intersection between epistemology and neighboring fields, e.g., ethics and the philosophy of mind.

In treating these and other topics, our primary concern is not to present or defend our own views but rather to enable the reader to better understand the contemporary debate.

However, our approach does not consist of providing a simple explication of competing views about a given issue.

Rather, throughout the book, we will offer proposals about what we believe is ultimately driving the debate. Thus, our aspiration is not to provide a mere survey of the debate but rather to identify and to begin to explore the underlying issues that we believe lie at its core, issues that need to be brought more fully into the center of the contemporary discussion.

This general approach influences not only the content but also the structure of the book.

This is seen, for example, in our treatment of skepticism.

While it is typical in epistemology books to begin with a discussion of skepticism, our own discussion of the topic occurs in the last two chapters of the book.

We believe that this inversion of the usual ordering is useful in as much as at the end of the book the reader will be better equipped to appreciate important subtleties in both the skeptic's argument and in the responses to that argument.

In particular, by the end of the book the reader will already be familiar with the notions of epistemic priority and defeasibility, notions which we believe are absolutely crucial to fully understanding the dialectic between the skeptic and his opponent. (Moreover, we also believe that an early focus on skepticism tends to distort the reader's approach to various other topics.)We will not presuppose that the reader is already familiar with the terrain of current views in epistemology.

With respect to content then, we will start at the very beginning.

Moreover, the book will be written in a provocative manner that is designed to stimulate interest in the subject.

In these respects, the book will be introductory in nature.

However, we assume that the typical reader of the book will possess a certain level of philosophical sophistication. (In this respect then, the book is not a 'gentle' introduction, of a kind that might be suitable for one who has no experience with philosophy at all.) Indeed, we anticipate that many of our readers will have already encountered and grappled with epistemological issues. Because it does not presuppose specific knowledge of the field, the book will be especially suitable for students: primarily intermediate and advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, as well as beginning graduate students.

As we have emphasized, however, the book will frequently address considerations and issues which we believe are either wholly absent or unduly neglected in the contemporary literature. For this reason, the book should be of considerable interest to the professional philosopher as well.

The book is thus intended for a relatively wide readership.