Please note: In order to keep Hive up to date and provide users with the best features, we are no longer able to fully support Internet Explorer. The site is still available to you, however some sections of the site may appear broken. We would encourage you to move to a more modern browser like Firefox, Edge or Chrome in order to experience the site fully.

Contested Economic Institutions : The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies, Paperback / softback Book

Contested Economic Institutions : The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies Paperback / softback

Part of the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series

Paperback / softback

Description

This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others.

Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis.

The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level.

The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.

Information

Save 3%

£23.99

£23.25

 
Free Home Delivery

on all orders

 
Pick up orders

from local bookshops

Information

Also in the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series  |  View all