Please note: In order to keep Hive up to date and provide users with the best features, we are no longer able to fully support Internet Explorer. The site is still available to you, however some sections of the site may appear broken. We would encourage you to move to a more modern browser like Firefox, Edge or Chrome in order to experience the site fully.

Tying the Autocrat's Hands : The Rise of The Rule of Law in China, Paperback / softback Book

Tying the Autocrat's Hands : The Rise of The Rule of Law in China Paperback / softback

Part of the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series

Paperback / softback


Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law?

What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes?

How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power?

Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China.

Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected.

He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm.

Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.




Free Home Delivery

on all orders

Pick up orders

from local bookshops


Also in the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series  |  View all